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ABSTRACT 
Seven states in the US outlaw public sector collective bargaining, but employees in these 
states still join unions. Public sector workers join unions in other states even when unions are 
unable to obtain collective agreements. Using the Current Population Survey Merged Outgoing 
Rotation  Group 2001-2010,  we estimate  union  membership  wage premium  for public sector 
employees across states with different public sector bargaining laws. We find that unionism is 
associated with higher earnings even in states that outlaw public sector bargaining.  Using the 
School and Staffing Survey for teachers, we find that a substantial and increasing proportion of 
school  districts  reach  meet-and-confer  agreements  with  teachers  unions  and  that  those 
agreements are associated with better retirement plans for teachers. The percentage of workers 
who  join  unions  in  a  school  district  is  associated  with  higher  earnings  and  lower  contract 
working days for union members in states that outlaw collective bargaining as well as in states 
that mandate bargaining, which suggests that density contributes to the success of unions in the 
absence of collective bargaining.  
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  The 2010-2011 attack on public sector bargaining in Wisconsin and Ohio and earlier 
executive orders by governors in Indiana, Missouri, and Kentucky to rescind bargaining by state 
employees  has  brought  questions  about  the  desirability  of  collective  bargaining  between 
government and employee organizations. The debates on the impact of collective bargaining on 
economic  outcomes  of  public  sector  employees  have  gained  national  attention.  Many 
conservative Republicans view public sector collective bargaining as usurping the authority of 
elected governments and as a barrier to an efficient low-cost public sector. Many Democrats 
view collective bargaining as a right of employees and as the best way to organize public sector 
labor markets.  
This paper seeks to inform this debate with new evidence on the relationship between the 
laws governing public sector bargaining, workers’ decisions to unionize, and the effects of public 
sector unions on economic outcomes. Using Current Population Survey (CPS) data, we compare 
union  membership  and  earnings  across  states  with  different  legal  regimes  for  public  sector 
bargaining.
3  The legal environments range   from states that outlaw public sector collective 
bargaining to states that mandate that state and local governments negotiate with unions and that 
allow unions and employers to require all workers covered by collective bargaining  to pay an 
agency shop fee to the union for providing them with union services.
4 Using School and Staffing 
Survey (SASS) data for teachers, we examine the link between unionism and work conditions 
and non-earnings “fringe benefits”.  
We find that: 
  1.  A  substantial  number  of  public  sector  workers  join  unions  in  states  that  outlaw 
collective bargaining, though at rates considerably below those in states with legal environments 
that mandate or permit collective bargaining. 
  2. Unionism is associated with higher earnings for members even in states that outlaw 
collective bargaining.  
                                                           
3 The legal environments were largely determined by state legislation enacted in the 1970s and 1980s. 
Wisconsin’s 2011 limitation of public sector bargaining for all public sector workers except police and 
firefighters; Michigan's 2012 “right-to-work” law; and the earlier executive orders by the governors of 
Missouri, Indiana, and Kentucky rescinding bargaining rights for state employees offer opportunities for 
before/after studies of the effect of legal environments on union membership and outcomes. 
4 Right-to-work laws prohibit such contracts. 3 
 
3.  Among  teachers,  meet-and-confer  agreements  have  increased  relative  to  collective 
bargaining  contracts.  Meet-and-confer  is  associated  with  higher  non-wage  benefits  in  states 
whose public sector laws strongly favor collective bargaining and to a weaker extent in states 
that outlaw collective bargaining. 
4. The effects of unionism are greater with higher union density. 
  In short, the legal framework for collective bargaining is important in determining the 
extent and ability of unions to organize and affecting labor market outcomes, but workers join 
public sector unions and gain benefits even absent the right to bargain.  
 
Legal Environment for Public Sector Unionism   
The legal environment for public sector unionism differs greatly by state.  As a broad 
summary of how states regulate public sector union activity, we categorize states along two 
dimensions: the legal status of public sector collective bargaining (CB) and of the agency shop. 
Using these criteria, we classify the states into the four groups shown in Table 1.  
The “High-CB” group contains 23 states that have compulsory collective bargaining laws 
and allow unions and employers to negotiate mandatory agency fees for workers who do not join 
the unions. The “Med-CB” group contains 11 states that have compulsory collective bargaining 
laws but also have “right to work” provisions for public sector workers that prohibit mandatory 
agency fees. The “Low-CB” group consists of 9 states that allow collective bargaining but do not 
require  public  sector  management  to  bargain  collectively  with  unions.  The  “No-CB”  group 
consists of 7 states that outlaw collective bargaining by public sector workers.  
Table  2  shows  the  number  of  teachers,  police,  firefighters,  and  all  state  and  local 
government employees (panel 1)
5 and the relevant union density (panel 2).  It is based on CPS 
Merged Outgoing Rotational Group file data for 2010. Highly populous East coast and West 
coast states have laws that require collective bargaining between public sector management and 
that allow agency fees. About half of all pub lic sector workers are in the High-CB group. The 
second largest number of public sector employees is in the No-CB group, which bans collective 
                                                           
5 We do not examine federal employees or postal workers, who are covered by national regulations. When 
we refer to public sector employees, we refer to state and local employees only. 4 
 
bargaining. Texas is the largest state in this category. About a quarter of all state and local 
employees are in the other two intermediate groupings.  
The density figures in panel 2 of the table justify the names we have given to the groups. 
For each of the categories of employees, the High-CB group has the largest union density among 
all groups followed by the Med-CB group. The low-CB group has higher density than the No-CB 
group  among  all  state  and  local  employees  and  among  teachers  but  not  among  police  and 
firefighters.  The  surprise  in  panel  2  is  the  significant  union  density  among  teachers,  police, 
firefighters, and other public sector workers in the seven states that outlaw collective bargaining.   
Readers may wonder why we do not use the CPS question on collective bargaining status 
in our analysis. The reason is that the CPS questions on unionism and collective bargaining gives 
a  misleading  picture  of  public  sector  collective  bargaining.  The  CPS  asks  if  someone  is  a 
member  of  a  union  and  then  asks  nonunion  workers  if  they  are  covered  by  a  collective 
bargaining contract.  The implicit assumption is that all union members are covered, which is a 
reasonable  assumption  for  the  private  sector  but  not  for  the  public  sector.  Tabulations  of 
collective bargaining coverage using the CPS data show substantial coverage in non-CB states, 
due to the erroneous assumption that union members have a contract which the law forbids. The 
validity  of  the  CPS  data  for  analyzing  public  sector  unionism  could  be  easily  enhanced  by 
extending the question on coverage to workers who say they are in a union. The bargaining 
coverage data could be even more improved by asking if workers were covered by a collective 
bargaining contract or by a meet-and-confer agreement, which our data suggests is substantial.  
For public sector teachers, the Department of Education’s School and Staffing Survey 
(SASS) data provides an alternative measure of unionization. The SASS is composed of a multi-
level surveys that obtain data from teachers, the schools in which they work, and the school 
districts to which the school belongs. It asks teachers about union membership and asks school 
districts about whether they have a collective bargaining contract or meet-and-confer agreement 
with a union. Calculating union density in the SASS for 2007-2008, Han (2012) finds a similar 
ranking by groups to that in table 2 but obtains a union density for teachers in No-CB states that 
is close to 50%, considerably larger than in table 2; and a difference in the union density between 5 
 
the Med-CB group and the High-CB group of 20 percentage points compared to 32 percentage 
points in Table 2.
6 
Differences in magnitudes between the CPS and  the SASS aside, both show that while 
public sector employees are more likely to join unions in states that mandate or allow collective 
bargaining, many workers join unions even without the legal possibility of collective bargaining, 
per the title of the paper. 
 
What Unions Do with and Without Collective Bargaining 
What benefits, if any, do unions gain for members without collective bargaining? The 
traditional  starting  statistic  for  assessing  the  economic  effects  of  unionism  are  estimates  of 
union-nonunion earnings gaps (Lewis, 1990). To obtain a large sample of workers by occupation 
and state, we pooled the CPS MORG data for 2001-2010 into a single data file and estimated ln 
hourly earnings equations for workers in different legal regimes and with different union status. 
We restricted the sample to full time workers who have usual weekly work hours of 30 or above; 
dropped  observations  if  the  values  for  usual  weekly  earnings  or  usual  hours  worked  were 
missing;  and  truncated  earnings  at  the  bottom  1  percentile.    To  compare  observationally 
equivalent workers, we included a kitchen sink of worker attributes in every regression: gender, 
education, potential experience and its squared, interaction between gender and experience and 
experience
2,  race,  ethnicity,  metropolitan  area,  population  size,  marital  status,  family  head, 
citizenship status, occupation, and industry. To capture common period effects, we included year 
dummies.  We weighted the regressions by the sample weights. 
Column 1 of table 3 summarizes the results of these regressions in terms of estimated 
coefficients on dummies for the High-CB, Med-CB, and Low-CB groups relative to the No-CB 
omitted reference group by occupation. The estimates show that earnings for teachers, police, 
firefighters, and other state and local employees are higher in states with the most favorable laws 
for public sector bargaining relative to the others. The workers in the High-CB group receive 10-
20 log points higher hourly earnings than the workers in the No-CB group, while workers in the 
intermediate  groups  have  little  or  no  edge  over  those  in  the  No-CB  group.  The  negligible 
                                                           
6 See Han (2012), Table 2. She also finds that the collective bargaining coverage in Med-CB group is as 
high as in High-CB group, which suggests that the absence of agency fee might produce many free riders. 6 
 
coefficient on workers in the Med-CB states, which have compulsory bargaining laws but have 
right-to-work laws that outlaw agency fees, could reflect the adverse effect of right-to-work on 
unions’ bargaining power in those states or could reflect some other factor that manifests itself in 
negligible wage effects and in right-to-work legislation.  
The  columns  2  of  each  occupational  group  add  union  membership  status  to  the 
regressions.  With the dummy variables for legal environment in the regression, the coefficient 
on union membership reflects the average union/nonunion earnings differentials across the legal 
regimes.  The estimates show that union members earn higher hourly earnings than non-members 
by 4.9 to 14.5 log points depending on their occupations.   
A priori it seems reasonable to expect the union/nonunion wage gap to differ in different 
legal regimes.  It should be larger, in particular, in states where collective bargaining is mandated 
than in states where collective bargaining is illegal. To see if this is the case, we  separately 
estimate the union premium from ln earnings equations for each of the legal groups. Table 4 
summarizes our findings. The coefficients under the heading OLS include the covariates listed in 
the  source  note.  The  coefficients  under  the  heading  OLS+state  add  state  dummies  to  the 
regression. Without state dummies, the regressions compare union members in all states in a 
group to non-members in all states in the group. This could capture differences associated with 
the  different  distribution  of  union  and  nonunion  workers  among  the  states.  However,  the 
regressions with the state dummies also have interpretative problems. Comparing union members 
to non-members within a state can produce differences due to selectivity of union members 
and/or to spillovers of union effects within a state (both likely to be greater within than across 
states).  In states where few workers are unionized, such as Mississippi, or almost all workers are 
unionized, such as Massachusetts, union members may be quite different than observationally 
equivalent non-members. In states with high union density, non-members may be covered by the 
same contract as members or work for an employer whose pay follows union settlements.  
The estimated coefficients in the OLS and OLS+state columns in table 4 are sufficiently 
similar to suggest that these concerns are not a first-order problem. The biggest differences in the 
estimated union membership premium are by occupation, not by inclusion/exclusion of the state 
dummies. The estimates for teachers show a significant union premium in the High-CB group, a 
smaller premium for the Med-CB group, and a small premium for the Low-CB and the No-CB 7 
 
groups, with the latter significant at the 10% level.
  The estimates for police show high premium 
under all legal settings. The estimates for firefighters show sizable premium for the High-CB and 
Med-CB  groups,  small  and  negligible  premium  for  the  low  CB  group,  and  then  a  sizable 
premium in the No-CB group. The estimates for other state and local workers have a similar 
pattern to the firefighters.  
Looking  across  the  occupations,  the  union  membership  premium  is  consistently 
significant  and positive in the High-CB and Med-CB  groups, where collective bargaining is 
mandatory. However, it is also positive and substantial for police, firefighters, and other public 
sector workers in states which outlaw collective bargaining and in states which permit but do not 
make  bargaining  mandatory.  This  suggests  that  unions  may  affect  outcomes  in  those  states 
outside of the traditional collective bargaining channel. 
It is possible that the estimated union effects in the states without collective bargaining or 
with  permissive  but  not  mandatory  laws  are  due  to  subtle  differences  between  union  and 
nonunion workers that the OLS regression model does not capture. To refine our comparison, we 
estimated union/nonunion differentials using propensity score matching for the probability that a 
worker would be unionized in each of the four legal groupings (see Appendix I for details). We 
checked how well the propensity score model did in constructing the comparison groups in two 
ways. First, we looked at histograms of propensity scores for union membership by union status.  
The histograms are symmetrical for nearly all our groups
7, as Figure 1 illustrates for teachers. 
Second, we calculated standard test statistics for the pattern of covariates in the propensity model 
between union and nonunion workers and found little difference.
8 Given a seemingly successful 
matching of union members with non-members, the difference in ln (hourly earnings) between 
the union member and paired non-member estimates the average treatment effect on the treated 
(ATT). 
                                                           
7 The exception is firefighters in No-CB group. 
8 We computed the percent difference of the sample means between the treated and non-treated group, 
called percent of bias, for each covariate used to estimate the propensity score. The percent of bias for 
most covariates was less than 5%, which suggested that most covariates were well balanced in all groups. 
We also performed a t-test of the mean difference between the treated and non-treated groups and found 
an insignificant difference for most covariates. 8 
 
The ATT column in table 4 records the weighted average of the mean differences.
9 The 
estimates are similar to those in the OLS calculations. The biggest change in coefficient s is for 
firefighters in the No-CB group, whose estimated union premium drops from significant 0.190 
(OLS) and 0.159 (OLS+state) to a still sizable positive but insignificant 0.082. Overall, however, 
the ATT estimates  from propensity score matching are consistent w ith those from  two OLS 
models in showing that  union  membership is positively associated with higher earnings for 
public sector workers in states which outlaw collective bargaining  as well as in states which 
permit collective bargaining without mandating it.   
Finally, we performed one additional “placebo” check to see whether the differences in 
table 4 are associated with public sector laws rather than with some unmeasured feature of the 
labor  markets  in  the  relevant  states.  We  estimated  union  wage  premium  for  private  sector 
workers for each of the four groups separately. Since private sector workers are covered by the 
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), differences in states’ public sector laws should not affect 
the private sector union/nonunion differentials. If the laws were also associated with private 
sector differentials, we would worry about interpreting the public sector results as reflecting the 
different legal environments. We found no such pattern: the union/nonunion differentials barely 
differ for private sector workers across the four legal groups.
10 
 
The Union Effects among Teachers: Meet-and-Confer Agreement   
Given that workers join unions in states which outlaw collective bargaining and in states 
which permit but do not encourage bargaining and that union members gain higher wage, how do 
the unions improve the well-being of members in those states?  
There are several mechanisms through which unions exert pressure on employers. They 
lobby legislators or other elected bodies. They contribute money and volunteer in campaigns to 
elect the candidates favorable to their members. They also provide education, legal assistance to 
members facing job-related problems, and advice independent of employers. The SASS data set 
for teachers contains information on one of these channels. The survey asks school districts 
                                                           
9 We estimated the variance of the estimator for ATT by bootstrapping. 
10 The OLS estimates of union/nonunion differentials is 11.6 ln points for High-CB group, 15.2 ln points 
for Med-CB group, 13.9 ln points for Low-CB group, and 12.1 ln points for No-CB group. 9 
 
whether they have collective bargaining or “meet-and-confer” agreements with teachers unions. 
Before states enacted laws mandating or permitting collective bargaining in the public sector in 
the  1970s,  meet-and-confer  was  the  primary  way  for  public  sector  unions  to  represent  their 
members’ interests to employers. During meet-and-confer, the union and management exchange 
views and discuss proposals, which can lead to an agreement that is likely to affect outcomes 
even absent a legally binding collective bargaining contract. In the states that prohibit public 
sector  bargaining,  meet-and-confer  is  the  only  agreement  option  available  to  employers  and 
employees. In other states, employers and employees can choose a meet-and-confer agreement 
instead of a bargaining contract.   
 Using three waves of School and Staffing Survey (SASS) school district data between 
1999  and  2008,  we  computed  the  number  of  school  districts  that  had  meet-and-confer 
agreements, the number that had collective bargaining agreements, and the number that had no 
agreements at all (see Appendix 2). Figure 2 shows a surprising increase in the proportion of 
school districts with meet-and-confer agreements, from about 8% in 1999 to 14% in 2008 and a 
commensurate drop in the proportion of school districts with collective bargaining agreements 
from  62%  in  1999  to  57%  in  2008.  The  proportion  with  no  agreements  was  held  roughly 
constant. Figure 3 takes this a step further by decomposing the proportion of school districts with 
meet-and-confer agreements across our legal regime groups. It shows that meet-and-confer is 
most common and increased rapidly in states in the Low-CB group, where collective bargaining 
is permitted but not mandatory. The figure also shows that meet-and-confer is least common but 
also increased substantially in states with mandatory collective bargaining, expanding from less 
than 2% of school districts in 1999 to more than 9% of schools districts in 2008.  In the Med-CB 
group and the No-CB group, meet-and-confer increased more modestly over the period.     
What do unions achieve for teachers in the different legal environments? How important 
is meet-and-confer in affecting outcomes?  
Panel 1 of table 5 summarizes the results of regressing outcome measures for teachers on 
union membership in each of the four legal settings, along with the covariates listed in the table 
note.  The  SASS  data  contains  a  somewhat  different  set  of  measures  than  the  CPS  data  for 
teachers related to the actual work of the teacher such as teaching level, teaching subjects, and so 
on as specified in the note to the table. The estimated wage premium for teachers in this table is a 10 
 
bit lower than in the CPS estimates for teachers in high CB states but is nearly identical for 
teachers in the No-CB (.016 vs. .017). The coefficients on contract days show little difference 
between union members and non-members in any of the calculations.    
 Panel 2 of table 5 presents coefficients results for regressions of the outcome variables 
on dummy variable indicating whether a teacher works in a school district that has collective 
bargaining  agreement  or  meet-and-confer  agreement  relative  to  a  school  district  that  has  no 
agreement at all, which serves as the reference group. The estimated coefficients in the High-CB 
states show that having a collective bargaining produces better working condition (lower contract 
days) for teachers. Meet-and-confer produce better non-wage benefits for teachers, notably in 
increasing the likelihood that an employer funds defined-contribution  retirement plan. In the 
Med-CB group, the coefficients on both collective bargaining and meet-and-confer show little 
relation to earnings and contract days but positive effects on the two measures of retirement 
benefits. In the Low-CB group, collective bargaining has a significant effect on contract days and 
a large impact on employer contributions to defined-contribution retirement plans but not on the 
other  outcomes,  while  meet-and-confer  agreements  have  no  noticeable  effect  on  any  of  the 
outcomes. In the No-CB group, meet-and-confer agreement have negligible effect on base salary, 
contract days, and employer contribution to retirement plan, but positive effect on the provision 
of  defined-contribution  retirement  plan.  Districts  that  have  meet-and-confer  agreements  with 
unions  have  significantly  higher  probability  to  offer  defined-contribution  retirement  plan  for 
their teachers compared to districts with no agreement. Overall, meet-and-confer agreements are 
positively associated with non-wage benefits.   
 
Union Density  
 
Analyses of union effects in the private sector often stress the need for unions to have a 
substantial share of the work force in a given sector to bargain for higher wages and benefits. If 
non-union competitors have a sizable share of the market and can provide good substitutes for 
the union-made products, union labor will likely have a high elasticity of demand, which will 
force the union to moderate bargaining demands for the fear of large job losses. In the public 
sector, union density is also likely to affect the ability of unions to obtain benefits for members 11 
 
through different pathways. Higher union density can translate into great lobbying and political 
pressure on government employers even in the absence of collective bargaining.    
We investigate the relation between union density and economic conditions of teachers 
using SASS 2007-2008 with the following equation: 
 
(1)  id d id d id District Teacher Density Outcome           4 3 1 0 ) ln(   
 
where the outcome variable relates to teacher i in district d and Teacher and District denote the 
covariates for teacher characteristics and districts characteristics respectively that are listed in the 
table note of Table 6.  
Table 6 reports OLS  estimates of the union  effect  on base salary  and  contract  days, 
separately  estimated  from  equation  (1)  for  each  of  the  legal  regime  groups.  We  run  the 
regressions for all teachers and then differentiate between union members and non-members. In 
the High-CB group, union density has a sizable positive effect on the base salary of all teachers 
due to its positive effect on members while it is negatively related to the pay of non-members.  
Density has an insignificant negative effect on the contract days, implying shorter contract days 
with  greater unionization, but this  effect  turns  out  to  be due to  the negative effect  on non-
members. In the Med-CB group, density also reduces contract days but in this case it is for union 
members.  
The  most  striking  result  in  table  6  is  for  the  No-CB  group.  Density  is  positively 
associated with the base salaries of union members, although the magnitude is smaller than in the 
High-CB group. Density also has a small positive impact on the base salaries of non-members, 
but with a high standard error. Density is significantly negatively related to contract days for 
union members and has a nearly significant effect on contract days of non-members. On average, 
an increase in district’s union density by 10 percentage points is associated with the increase in 
base  salary  by  0.4  percent  and  with  the  decrease  in  contract  days  by  0.2  percent.  Density, 
therefore, appears to be a particularly important channel for unions to benefit members in the 
absence of the right to collectively bargain. 
In sum, our empirical analysis of the SASS data for teachers shows that teachers unions 
improve  members’  well-being  absent  collective  bargaining  partly  through  meet-and-confer 12 
 
agreements. However, the key to unions’ impact is the high union density in the school district in 
which they operate.  
Conclusion 
Our analysis of CPS data for teachers, police, firefighters, and all other state and local 
employees shows that public sector workers join unions and that membership is associated with 
higher earnings even in states that outlaw collective bargaining. Our analysis of the SASS data 
highlights the growth of meet-and-confer agreements and the importance of union density in 
gaining benefits for members of teachers unions in states that outlaw collective bargaining as 
well as in states with laws favorable to collective bargaining. The ability of public sector unions 
to attract workers and improve their well-being in the absence of collective bargaining resonates 
with recent developments in the private sector in which unions, labor activists, and workers have 
formed  non-bargaining  organizations  to  help  the  workers  in  the  labor  market.
11  Collective 
bargaining for a majority of workers at a given workplace has been at the heart of US unionism 
for decades, but it is not the only way for unions and workers to advance employee s’ interests. 
The experience of the public sector unions who operate without collective bargaining power has 
potentially important lessons for private sector unions and worker groups who are following the  
same path. 
                                                           
11 These include: worker centers that aid low wage immigrant workers, occupation-based unions that seek 
to affect labor market regulations without collective bargaining contracts such as the New York Taxi-
drivers  Alliance  (http://www.nytwa.org)  or  that  provide  benefits  to  freelancers  who  shift  employers 
frequently  (www.freelancersunion.org),  minority  union  locals  (www.Alliance@IBM),  and  non-union 
employee  groups  (OurWalmart,  http://forrespect.org)  that  seek  to  improve  the  economic  position  of 
workers without a collective contract. See Freeman (2012). 13 
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Figure 1: Histogram for Propensity Scores for Teachers, by Group 
      Source: CPS MORG 2001-2010 
 
Figure 2: Percentage of School Districts with Collective Bargaining Contracts,  
Meet-and-Confer Agreements or No Agreements, 1998-2008 
 
 
           Source: SASS (School and Staffing Survey) School District Data, 1999-2008 
  
Figure 3: Percentage of School Districts with Meet-and-Confer Agreements, 1998-2008  
by Group 
 
 Source: SASS (School and Staffing Survey) School Districts Data, 1999-2008 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Legal Environments toward Collective Bargaining of Public Sector Employees 
Group  Definition  States 
High-CB 
States that have 
collective bargaining 
laws and allow agency 
fees 
Alaska, California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, 
Maryland,  Massachusetts,  Michigan,  Minnesota,  Montana,  New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin 
Med-CB 
States that have 
collective bargaining 
laws but prohibit 
agency fees 
Florida, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, Nevada, North 
Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Tennessee 
Low-CB 
States that do not have 
collective bargaining 
laws but allow 
collective bargaining 
Alabama,  Arkansas,  Colorado,  Kentucky,  Louisiana,  Missouri, 
Utah, West Virginia, Wyoming 
No-CB 
States that ban 
collective bargaining of 
public sector workers 
Arizona,  Georgia,  Mississippi,  North  Carolina,  South  Carolina, 
Texas, Virginia 
Source: “Teacher Monopoly, Bargaining, and Compulsory Unionism, and Deduction Revocation Table”,  
National Right to Work Foundation (2010)  
 
Table 2: The Employment and Union Density in the Public Sector 
Panel 1: Employment by Occupation, in Thousands 
Group  Teacher  Police  Firefighter  State & Local 
employees 
High-CB  1,852  363  140  9,007 
Med-CB  538  108  60  2,687 
Low-CB  391  58  27  1,836 
No-CB  876  139  57  3,811 
Total  3,657  668  284  17,341 
Panel 2: Union Density by Occupation 
Group  Teacher  Police  Firefighter  State & Local 
employees 
High-CB  84.70%  79.21%  88.86%  60.81% 
Med-CB  52.35%  45.53%  52.75%  25.58% 
Low-CB  46.37%  19.51%  39.29%  19.58% 
No-CB  26.77%  29.41%  41.46%  13.67% 
Source: CPS MORG 2010 File 
 
Table 3: Estimated OLS Regression Coefficients on the relation of Legal Environment and 
Union membership Status of Public sector workers, by occupation   
Dependent Variable: ln(hourly wage) 
Occupation  Teacher  Police  Firefighter  Other state  
& local workers 
  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2)  (1)  (2) 
Union      0.049***    0.141***     0.145***    .068*** 
High-CB  0.143***  0.115***  0.179***  0.107***  0.205***  0.147***  .132***  .101*** 
Med-CB  -0.008  -0.019  0.067  0.04  0.054  0.022  -0.001  -0.006 
Low-CB  -0.026  -0.035  -0.005  -0.011  -0.006  -0.023  0.003  -0.001 
N  31,231  31,231  6,327  6,327  2,474  2,474  112,374  112,374 
R  0.26  0.27  0.21  0.22  0.24  0.26  0.34  0.35 
Source: CPS MORG 2001-2010.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Control variables of OLS regression for teacher, police, and firefighter: gender, education, potential experience and 
its squared, interaction between gender and experience, interaction between gender and experience
2,  categorical 
dummies for race, ethnicity, metropolitan area, population size, marital status, a dummy for family head, citizenship 
status and year dummies. For other public employees, categorical dummies for broad industry and occupation are 
also included. All regressions use persons’ final weight.  
 
 
 
  
 
Table 4: Estimates of Union Membership Premium for the Public Sector, by Occupation 
Dependent Variable: ln(hourly wage) 
Group 
Teacher  Police 
OLS  OLS+ 
state  ATT  N  OLS  OLS+ 
state  ATT  N 
High-CB  .103***  .093***  .113***  15,947  .153***  .151***  .143***  3,417 
Med-CB  .028***  .024***  .028**  6,206  .139***  .118***  .16***  1,209 
Low-CB  .016  .009  .019  3,968  .171***  .138***  .133***  762 
No-CB  .017*  .019  .017  5,110  .102***  .088***  .073*  939 
 
Group 
Firefighter  Other state & local workers 
OLS  OLS+ 
state  ATT  N  OLS  OLS+ 
state  ATT  N 
High-CB  .156***  .153***  .125***  1,375  .064***  .054***  .077***  58,287 
Med-CB  .088*  .092  .012  483  .076***  .066***  .075***  22,385 
Low-CB  .029  .026  .005  285  .027***  .029***  .031**  14,634 
No-CB  .18**  .127**  .081  331  .082***  .083***  .074***  17,068 
Source: CPS MORG 2001-2010.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
Covariates are the same as in table 3 All regressions use persons’ final weight. The covariates to estimate 
the propensity score for union membership include the same control variables for OLS regression, as well 
as interactions between variables and higher order terms. 
 
  
Table 5: Estimates of Coefficients and Standard Errors for the Effect of Union Membership, 
Collective Bargaining, and Meet-and-Confer on Teacher Compensation, by Group 
Dependent Variables 
Teacher level dependent variable  District level dependent variable 
ln(base salary)  ln(contract days)  Districts has DC 
retirement plan 
Districts 
contributes  funds 
Panel 1. Effect of Union Membership by Group 
1.  High-CB group  .064(.017)***  -.003(.013)     
2.  Med-CB group  .008(.006)  -.004(.005)     
3.  Low-CB group  .011(.007)  -.000(.007)     
4.  No-CB group  .016(.007)***  .001(.007)     
Panel 2:  Effects of Collective Bargaining (CB) and Meet-and-Confer (MC) by Group 
1.  High-CB group 
  Coefficient (SE) on CB   .032(.045)  -.024(.014)*  .156(.093)  .126(.074) 
  Coefficient (SE) on MC   .036(.048)  -.009(.014)  .06(.120)  .217(.073)*** 
2.  Med-CB group 
  Coefficient (SE) on CB   -.019(.015)  .003(.011)  .019(.052)  .119(.074) 
  Coefficient (SE) on MC   -.005(.017)  -.007(.012)  .028(.069)  .147(.04)*** 
3.  Low-CB group 
  Coefficient (SE) on CB   -.018(.014)  -.038(.016)*  -.034(.11)  .242(.162) 
  Coefficient (SE) on MC   .014(.011)  .006(.008)  -.028(.034)  .023(.067) 
4.  No-CB group 
  Coefficient (SE) on CB   NA  NA  NA  NA 
  Coefficient (SE) on MC   -.025(.012)  -.020(.012)  .126(.052)**  -.061(.129) 
Source: Han (2012), from Table 7. SASS (School and Staffing Survey) 2007-2008.  
Errors are clustered within districts (presented in parentheses). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Columns listed as teacher level variable, based on SASS district-teacher matched data set.  Control variables for 
SASS  district-teacher  matched  dataset  :  gender,  ethnicity,  race,  a  dummy  for  full-time  teachers,  a  dummy  for 
secondary schools (grades 7th -12th) teachers, experience, experience2, interaction between experience and gender 
and between experience2 and gender, education level, teaching subjects, school program types, log (number of days 
in the school year) used in ln base salary regression only, log (total students enrollment of grades K-12), fraction of 
students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch program, students’ ethnicity and race, log (district revenue), log 
(CWI), and 11 urban-centric locality code of the districts that schools are located in.   
 
Columns listed as district level variable, based on SASS district level data set.  Control variables for SASS district 
level dataset: log (revenue), log (CWI), a dummy variable indicating if a district requires high school students to 
pass a state or district assessment to earn high school diploma, log (total student enrollment grades K-12), fraction of 
students eligible for free or reduced-price lunch program, log (number of school days), a dummy for district offering 
classes to secondary grades (7th -12th), students’ ethnicity and race, teachers’ ethnicity and race, and 7 dummies for 
census district locale codes. 
  
Table 6: Estimates of Coefficients and Standard Errors for the Relation between Union Density and 
Teacher Compensation by Union Membership, by Group 
  High-CB  Med-CB  Low-CB  No-CB 
Panel 1: ln(Base Salary) 
Member  .145(.049)**  .023(.023)  .027(.026)  .038(.019)* 
Non-member  -.098(.062)  -.004(.031)  -.065(.026)*  .017(.045) 
All  .132(.027)***  .014(.017)  -.008(.018)  .041(.017)** 
         
Panel 2: ln(Contract days) 
Member  .017(.036)  -.025(.011)**  -.003(.024)  -.049(.024)** 
Non-member  -.102(.067)  -.014(.02)  -.091(.023)  -.020(.013) 
All  -.020(.016)  -.018(.009)*  -.004(.014)  -.022(.012)* 
Source: SASS (School and Staffing Survey) 2007-2008 
Note: Errors are clustered within districts (presented in parentheses). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Control variables: gender, ethnicity, race, a dummy for full-time teachers, a dummy for teachers who 
teach at secondary schools (grades 7th-12th), teaching experience, experience2, interaction between the 
experience and gender, education level, teaching subjects, school program types, log (number of days in 
the school year), log (CWI), log (total students enrollment of grades K-12), fraction of students eligible 
for free or reduced-price lunch program, students’ ethnicity and race, and 11 urban-centric locality code 
of the districts that schools are located in.  
Appendix I: Propensity Score Matching Model 
 
  To treat the selection bias for unionization within the same legal environment bargaining, we use 
propensity score matching. Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) defined propensity score as the conditional 
probability of receiving a treatment given pre-treatment characteristics: 
 
(1)  ) | ( ) | 1 Pr( ) ( X D E X D X p    ,  
 
where  D  ={0,  1}  is  the  indicator  of  exposure  to  treatment  and  X  is  the  vector  of  pretreatment 
characteristics. If the exposure to treatment is random within cells defined by multidimensional X, it is 
also  random  within  cells  defined  by  the  values  of  the  propensity  score, ) (X p .  Two  very  important 
assumptions must be addressed for propensity score matching.  
 
Assumption 1  The balancing property of pretreatment covariates given propensity score:  ) ( | X p X D   
 
Assumption 2  Unconfoundedness given propensity score: If  X D Y Y i i | , 0 1  , then  ) ( | , 0 1 X p D Y Y i i   
 
  The first assumption implies that observations with the same propensity score must have the same 
distribution of observable characteristics independently of treatment status. In other words, for a given 
propensity score, exposure to treatment is random and on average treated and control units should be 
observationally  identical.  The  second  assumption  means  that  if  the  treatment  decision  is  random 
conditional on the pretreatment observable characteristics (selection on observables), then all selection 
biases due to observable covariates can be removed conditional on propensity score.  
Let  i Y1  and  i Y0  be the potential outcome of treated unit and untreated unit, respectively. Then, 
then the Average Treatment effect on the Treated (ATT) can be estimated once the propensity is given: 
 
(2)        ) ( , 1 | 1 | 0 1 0 1 i i i i i i i X p D Y Y E E D Y Y E ATT        
                 1 | ) ( , 0 | ) ( , 1 | 0 1      i i i i i i i D X p D Y E X p D Y E E  
 
  Suppose that  worker i  has  a  propensity  score  of joining  the  unions  (p)  as a function  of the 
covariates (X) such that ) | 1 Pr( ) ( x X D x p i i i    , where D indicates if the worker joins the unions. 
We use logit regression to estimate propensity score since the treatment status is a binary variable:  
(3)  Unioni=  i i X      1 0  
where X represents the covariates that determine selection into treatment. X can include higher order 
terms of covariates and interactions between the covariates.
12 The propensity score is the predicted value 
of Union that I get from this regression. For a matching algorithm, I use the nearest neighbor (NN) 
matching based on propensity score. NN matching takes each treated unit and search for the control unit 
with the closet propensity score, so all treated units find a match.  
  Following Becher and Ichino (2002), let T be the set of treated units (union members) and C be 
the set of control units (workers who are not members of unions), and let 
T
i Y  and 
C
m Y  be the salary of the 
union members and non-members, respectively. Denote by C(i) the set of non-members matched to the 
union member i with the estimated propensity score pi. Then, NN matching has sets that are defined as 
|| || min ) ( m i m p p i C    
Let 
T
i N  be the number of units in the treated group (number of union members) and
C
i N  be the 
number of units in the control units (number of non-member) matched with union member i. Control units 
are given an initial weight proportionate to the number of control units that are matched with treated unit, 
which is then rescaled so that the sum of weights equals the number of matched treated units.  
To avoid bad matches and keep potential bias low, we apply the “with replacement” option that 
allows a control unit to be the best match for more than one treated unit. We impose the common support 
restriction to improve the quality of the matches, so we only consider observations whose propensity 
score in the intersection of the regions of the propensity score of the treated and the control units. In 
matching with replacement, the weights of control units that were reused are summed across all matches 
in which the control unit was used. Denote  C
i
im N
w
1
  if  ) (i C m  and  0  other w ise,  so   
i
im m w w  
The ATT estimator from NN matching is:  
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We use bootstrapping to estimate the variance of the ATT estimator,   taking account of the 
variance from the estimation of the propensity score, the imputation of the common support, and etc. 
                                                           
12 The base covariates to estimate the propensity score for union membership are gender, education, 
potential experience  and  its  squared, interaction  between  gender  and  experience,  interaction  between 
gender  and  experience
2,  categorical  dummies  for  race,  ethnicity,  metropolitan  area,  population  size, 
marital status, a dummy for family head, citizenship status and year dummies. Some interaction terms 
between variables and higher order terms of potential experience are also included in some groups.  
Appendix II: Agreement Status between Teachers Unions and School Districts 
Group  Year  # of districts 
with MC 
# of districts 
with CB 
# of districts 
with No 
Agreement 
Total # of  
Districts 
High-CB 
1999  41  2,070  82  2,198 
2003  54  1,819  169  2,042 
2007  194  1,793  149  2,136 
Med-CB 
1999  123  767  190  1,080 
2003  96  734  170  1,000 
2007  149  758  148  1,055 
Low-CB 
1999  125  68  463  656 
2003  131  81  418  630 
2007  192  70  435  697 
No-CB 
1999  80  5  676  761 
2003  90  12  644  746 
2007  93  5  615  713 
All States 
1999  369  2,910  1,411  4,690 
2003  371  2,646  1,401  4,418 
2007  628  2,626  1,347  4,601 
Source: School and Staffing Survey (SASS) 1999-2008 